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Comment

Crashing Into Proof of a Reasonable Alternative
Design: The Fallacy of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability
INTRODUCTION

On May 20, 1997, at its annual meeting in Washington, D.C., the
council of the American Law Institute ("ALI") adopted the final
draft of its long awaited and controversial Restatement (Third) of
Torts, bearing on the topic of products liability.' This effort was
labeled by the learned reporters as the ALI's "rational and
responsible resolution" to the ongoing and fiercely debated
controversy surrounding the law of strict products liability, a field
known to many by its section number in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.

2

1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrY §§ 1-21 (1997). "The subject [of
torts] has become too broad and too intricate to be encompassed in a single project, even
one as prolonged as [the] Restatement Second .... ." Id. at xv. "Products Liability is the first
product of the Institute's long-term undertaking to revise and update the Restatement Second
of Torts." Id.
2. Id. at xv; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRss § 402A (1968). The influential Section
402A, titled Special Liability of Seller of Productsfor Physical Harm to User or Consumer,
states in its entirety as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. Section 402A states a rule best categorized as strict products liability in tort, as opposed
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The principal points of contention among participants in the
debate over the future development of strict products liability
jurisprudence center around the applicability of strict liability in
design defect cases, and the proper evidentiary form sufficient to
meet the burden of proof in a design defect case. 3 There is no
evidence of harsh disagreements over the efficacy of the
substantive law of strict products liability, or its underlying social
policy. No one on either side of the arguments associated with
strict products liability law has espoused the alteration or
4
abrogation of the social policy underlying strict products liability.
to other theories of recovery for personal injury or property damage caused by defective
products, such as negligence and contract-based warranty claims. See generally 63 AM. JuR.
2D Products Liability § 3 (1996) (stating that "a person who suffers injury or damage in
using a product delivered by the manufacturer, processor, or seller in a defective condition
may... sue for breach of express or implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code,
or sue in negligence, [or] bring an action seeking to enforce strict tort liability"). "[Section
402A] liability for defective products is 'strict' in the sense that it is unnecessary to prove the
defendant's negligence and, since the liability is 'in tort,' the defendant cannot avail himself
of the usual contract or warranty defenses . . ." such as lack of privity. 63 AM. Ju. 2D
Products Liability § 3 (1996); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1968).
For an overview of products liability based on negligence theory, see 63 AM. Ju. 2D
Products Liability §§ 204-516 (1996). For an overview of products liability based on breach
of warranty theory, see id. at §§ 659-884. For an overview of products liability based on
strict liability (in tort) theory, see id. at §§ 517-658. Finally, for an overview of products
liability based on other theories, such as fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and nuisance, see
63A AM. Jun. 2D Products Liability §§ 885-929 (1996).
Throughout this comment, every attempt has been made to be precise when referring to
strict products liability, the genesis of which in most jurisdictions is Section 402A, as
opposed to products liability generally; the reader should be aware that a general reference
to a jurisdiction's law of products liability may include its law regarding negligence and
contract based claims.
3. Strict products liability in tort, as with other theories of products liability, is
grounded on a finding that the product involved was defective at the time it left the
defendant's control. See generally 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability §§ 6, 12 (1996).
Defective products are generally divided into three categories: products that are defectively
manufactured, products that are defectively designed, and products that are defective due to
an inadequate warning regarding the proper use of the product. See generally id. at § 8. This
comment focuses on strict products liability cases based on a design defect; unlike a
manufacturing defect, a design defect cannot be detected by comparing the allegedly
defective product against the manufacturer's standard product because if a product is
defectively designed, the entire line of products is defective. See 63A AM. JuR. 2D Products
Liability § 930 (1996). "Due to the absence of an objective measure of defectiveness, design
defect cases present the most difficult problems in the field of products liability litigation."
Id.
4. That policy is embedded in the law of strict products liability as defined in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A, which is the basis for the development of strict
products liability law in most of the United States. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A cmt. c (1968), which states as follows:
[T]he public has the right to and does expect . . . that reputable sellers will stand
behind their products [and] public policy demands that the burden of accidental
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That deeply rooted social policy recognizes that the manufacturer
who places a product in the commercial stream is in a better
position than the consumer (or other foreseeable user) to bear the
costs of injury resulting from the use of the product, by including
the costs of liability in the price of the product.5 This policy is
often stated in some variation of the following phrase: "The
doctrine of strict liability places the product supplier in the role of
a guarantor of the product's safety, but it does not make6 the
supplier an insurer against all injuries caused by the product."
The reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, however, seek
to avoid the manufacturer-as-guarantor policy underlying strict
products liability law in cases alleging a design defect. The
avoidance technique they propose is contained in Section 2(b),
which imposes on plaintiffs advancing a design defect theory in a
strict products liability suit the responsibility of proving a
"reasonable alternative design. "7 Because a reasonable alternative
design requirement, by its nature, injects negligence principles into
such cases, this proposed rule would effectively remove design
defect cases from the realm of strict liability and place them in the
arena of negligence, thereby providing manufacturers with a
distinct advantage; in the negligence realm, the social policy of
manufacturer-as-guarantor, which underlies strict products liability,
is not recognized.
injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance
can be obtained; . . . the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of
protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who
market the products.
Id.; see generally 63 An Jun. 2D Products Liability § 521 (1996).
5. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 898 (Pa. 1975); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1965); see also 63 An. JuR. 2D Products
Liability § 3 (1996).
6. 63 Am. JuR 2D ProductsLiability § 522 (1996).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2b (1997). Section 2(b) reads,
[A product] is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe ....
Id. The reporters for the Restatement (Third) note in their Introduction that "Section 2(b)
generated considerable controversy [because it] calls for proof of a reasonable alternative
design in order to sustain an action for defective design." Id. at 4. The reporters believe that
when the entire Restatement (Third) is read as a whole, the impact of this requirement is
lessened; they warn that "[o]verzealous advocates may seek to focus the attention of courts
on § 2(b) alone. Users of this Restatement are cautioned against such a fragmented reading."

1062

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:1059

The purpose of this comment is twofold; first, to illuminate the
subjective motives and the over-stretched legal analysis of the
restatement reporters as they attempt to introduce a reasonable
alternative design requirement to the law of strict products liability
pertaining to design defect cases; second, to question whether the
ALI was improperly influenced in agreeing to the utilization of the
restatement process as the vehicle for accomplishing that goal.
Part One examines the history and rationale behind the ALI's
efforts to construct restatements of the law, to determine whether
any of the ALI's stated goals were advanced by the completion of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Further, Part
One will look at the possibility that special interests, specifically
insurance industry groups, utilized improper financial influence
over both the ALI's decision to go forward with the restatement
project, and its final result.
Focusing on the concept of "reasonable alternative design," Part
Two examines a representative sample of the very case law relied
on by the reporters of the Restatement (Third) to expose their
fallacy in drawing the conclusion that a majority of American
jurisdictions already require proof (expressly or implicity) of a
reasonable alternative design in a strict products liability case
alleging design defect.
Part Three then focuses upon the present state of strict products
liability law in Pennsylvania, where the imposition of the
reasonable alternative design requirement would uniquely
undermine decades of developmental jurisprudence in this area of
the law.
I.

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE RESTATEMENTS OF THE LAW

The ALI was incorporated in 1923, with the express purpose of
"promoting the clarification and simplification of the law and its
better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better
administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly
and scientific legal work."8 In an effort to instill credibility into the
work of the ALI, one of the initial incorporators, William Lewis
Draper, recruited highly respected members from a wide
cross-section of the legal community.9 Once assembled, the group
8. See Fred C. Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in the Restatement of Law Governing
Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality ProvisionsRestate the Law, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 903,
919 (1993) (citing William Draper Lewis, How We Did It, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LAw
INSTITUTE AND THE FIRST RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw (ALI ed. 1945)).
9. See id. at 921. An example of the caliber of persons originally associated with the
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undertook to write a restatement of the entire law. 10 This massive
project was motivated by the belief that the proliferating size of the
body of precedent case law had forced local lawyers and state
court judges into local isolation due to their inability to access this
larger body of information. 1 Thus, relying on only a relatively few
state court rulings on any particular legal issue, state courts could
easily lose perspective and arrive at conclusions inconsistent with
2
general common law.'
Since the early days of the ALI, the practical and theoretical
reasons supporting its restatement approach to the law have
undergone significant change. Several factors combined to
influence the change in direction undertaken by the ALI. First,
several philosophical theories espousing the notion that the law
should reflect the society it serves came into vogue and received
significant approval among contemporary scholars.13 Further,
encouraged by the widespread recognition and acceptance of
previously completed restatement works, subsequent drafters
hoped to utilize the restatement as a vehicle with which to
influence the future direction of the law, and bring about social
change. 4 Finally, and most significantly, American legal publishers
had undertaken to catalogue and cross reference the huge volume
Institute was the preeminent New York jurist and future Supreme Court Justice, Benjamin
Cardozo. Concerning the purpose of the institute and the need for its establishment, Cardozo
remarked:
The American Law Institute . . . is the first cooperative endeavor by all the groups
engaged in the development of law to grapple with the monster of uncertainty and
slay him. It proposes a scientific and accurate restatement of the law ... [Ilt will be
something less than a code and something more than a treatise. It will be invested
with unique authority, not to command, but to persuade. It will embody a composite
thought and speak a composite voice. Universities and bench and bar will have had a
part in its creation... [Tihe plan reduces to a minimum the likelihood of failure. If
these men cannot restate the law, then the law is incapable of being restated by
anyone.
Id. at 921-22 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 6-9 (1924) (quoting a
speech given by Cardozo expressing his support for the establishment of the ALT and
approving of the restatement approach).
The "monster of uncertainty" that Cardozo spoke of was the ever growing and sometimes
unmanageable body of precedent case law. See id. The well-known analogy often used to
describe the development of common law rules is that of the runaway calf, twisting this way
and that. See Max Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORNELL L QUARTERLY 137 (1946).
10. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 920.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 922. Roscoe Pound's notions of "Societal Jurisprudence" and Carl
Llewellyn's views on "Legal Realism" completely rejected the doctrine of stare decisis as a
sound basis upon which to develop the future of American jurisprudence. See id.
14. See id. at 923.
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of case law, allowing judges, lawyers, and their clerks to access
and assimilate the previous opinions into their decisions. 15
As an acknowledgement to these changes, a debate ensued
within the ALI, which continues even today, as to whether the
restatements should continue to strive to state what the law is, or
attempt to identify what the law should be.' 6 In the midst of this
debate, the ALI began the second series of restatements in the
early to mid 1960s.' 7 These projects proceeded under the
supposition that the new restatements, by identifying "true law"
and highlighting disagreement among the states, could help bring
order to chaos.1 8 These new restatements no longer purported to
identify the single correct rule; rather they attempted to focus and
narrow the debate over contentious issues, identify what were the
best options, and explain the preferences of the ALL's wise
leaders.1 9
Recent developments surrounding the ALI effort at producing the
third series of restatements indicate that there is a new force
impacting the ALL regarding its purpose and role in helping to
develop the law.20 That force is found in the lobbying power of
special interest groups with whom many of the members of the ALI
are aligned.2 ' These special interest forces have succeeded in
shifting the purpose of the instant restatement project away from
clarification of the law, identification of the arguments, and
proposals for reasonable resolutions, and toward the purpose of
2
advancing the partisan positions of the special interest groups. It
15. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 923. The volume of cases had increased, but it was
no longer indigestible. These developments made restatements in the original form less

important; in other words, just another secondary source. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 924.
18. See id. at 924. In 1960, the AL altered its policy to allow for reporters to advocate
the adoption of minority rules applicable to novel issues when the members agreed that
courts were more likely to adopt such rules in the future. See id. The ALI relied on its
prestigious reputation in the hope that the legal community would defer to its respected
membership, drawn from bench, bar, and academia, and would be trusted to perceive the
issues and explain why a "correct" minority position should be adopted. See id.
19. See id. at 925.
20. See Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of ALI Members in
Drafting the Restatements, 26 HoFsm4 L REv. 641 (1998).
21. See id. at 643. ALI members have been lobbied with respect to their votes on both
preliminary questions and final drafts of AU projects by business clients, large corporate
clients, and lobbyist representing industry clients such as the insurance industry. See id.
22. See id. The foreward to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
admits that it "of course 'goes beyond the law' as the law otherwise would stand[; a]
Restatement that was simply a photograph would not be worth the effort that goes into an
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is the hope of such groups that by influencing a restatement
project, they will be able to utilize the substantial influence that the
previous ALI restatements have had on the courts in developing the
law to advance their single point of view regarding the subject of
the restatement. 23 To allow such biased interests to influence the
restatement projects would only serve to undermine the
long-standing credibility of the AL.

24

The ALI has traditionally been insistent that "members should
and do leave their clients at the door."25 However, it appears that
the pressures asserted on ALI members by their high priced clients
and their own interests have increased the likelihood that such
pressures will have significant influence on the members' voting
decisions. 26 Recognition of this fact by Mr. Roswell Perkins in 1991
prompted the then president of the ALI to remark to members that
"the precept of leaving one's client at the door must be honored if
we are to preserve our integrity as an organization." 27 Perkins went
on to say that members were mobilizing "outside influences" with
28
possible "economic implications" to influence ALI members.
"What this means is that some members were getting lucrative
clients to threaten to give or withhold their legal business
depending on how members voted on particular issues."2 9
More disturbing is the fact that the special interest element has
recently succeeded in installing as a restatement reporter Professor
James A. Henderson, Jr., a legal scholar noted for his strong
Institute product [and] a photograph of the law in this field would have been a blurred image
of confusion." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY xvi (1997).
23. See Freedman, supra note 20, at 643.
24. See id. at 641. Professor Freedman concluded:
The American Law hIstitute's reputation for impartial judgment in formulating
Restatements of the Law has been compromised by conflicts of interest on the part of
ALI members who vote on Restatement provisions. That is, there is a significant risk
that the independent professional judgment of All members has been materially and
adversely affected by the interests of members' clients and by the members' own
interests. As a result, no judge, scholar, or student can rely on a Restatement rule or
comment as representing the objective judgment of ALI members, unaffected by the
partisanship of advocates who are creating precedents to protect their clients' and
their own interests in future litigation.
Id. Professor Freedman's status as a distinguished professor of legal ethics and an elected
life member of the American Law Institute lends heightened credibility to his observations
and conclusions. See id.
25. See id. at 643.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Freedman, supra note 20, at 643.
29. See id.
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partisan views with respect to the restatement topic on which he
writes. Professor Henderson and Professor Aaron D. Twerski are
the official reporters responsible for the drafting of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.30 Evidence exists
demonstrating that Professor Henderson desires to utilize his
position to capitalize on the substantial deference courts have given
to previous ALI restatements, and thereby interject his personal
views into the law of products liability. 31 Professor Henderson's
32
long time advocation of tort reform is well documented.
Beginning with his writings in the early 1980s, Henderson has
exhibited his disdain for the concept of strict liability, especially as
it relates to theories of products liability. 3
Henderson insists that "tort liability must be premised on fault,
and that only foreseeable risks may be taken into account."w In
applying his view to cases of products liability, Henderson would
agree that strict liability should apply to alleged manufacturing
defects because liability in such cases is determined narrowly and
objectively, by reference to the manufacturer's own standards.35 He
would not, however, apply strict liability in design and warning
defect cases, because without an objective standard, courts will
36
inappropriately second guess strict products liability decisions.
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTs LIABILITY §§ 1-21 (1997).
31. See James A. Henderson, Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social
Insurance, 10 TouRo L REV. 107, 119 (1993). In this article, Professor Henderson states that
in his opinion, tort-run social insurance is pro-consumer, he would not want to see it
implemented as a working protective device for consumers, and he promises that it will not
be under the revised Restatement. Id.
32. See Theodore Isenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L REV. 731 (1992) (providing a statistical analysis designed to
show the decline in pro-plaintiff judgments and corresponding monetary awards in strict
products liability cases, and to lend support to the argument for the need for reform in that
area of the law); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision

of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L REV. 1512 (1992) (stating
that doctrinal developments in products liability have placed such a heavy gloss on the
original text of, and comments to, Section 402A as to render them anachronistic, and at odds
with their currently discerned objectives).
33. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products
Liability, 69 CAL L REV. 919 (1981). See also ProductsLiability Reform: Hearings before the
Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. of Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 22, (1982) (statement of Professor James A. Henderson, Jr.). In
testimony on products liability reform, after referring to the high administrative costs of tort
law, Professor Henderson said, "If I were a cynic, I would say that if this is a social
insurance scheme, it is being run primarily to benefit the trial bar." Id.
34. See Note, Just What You'd Expect: Professor Henderson's Redesign of Products
Liability, 111 IiAnv L REV. 2366, 2369 (1998) [hereinafter Henderson's Redesign].
35. See id.
36. See id.
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Among other things, this negligence based system of liability, which
Henderson sees as the only fair way of apportioning liability, allows
manufacturers of potentially dangerous products to establish for
themselves the extent of their duty to their customers, and would
37
go against the weight of authority in most jurisdictions.
Furthermore, in a 1993 presentation before the Symposium on
the Revision of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A,
Henderson dismissed the risk spreading rationale for strict
products liability, and characterized the concept of "tort as social
insurance" as a "miserable flop."3 Henderson's stated position is
that the social insurance rationale should not be applied in cases
so as to provide "working protective device" for consumers. He
intends to use his position as a reporter to ensure that such a
39
policy is not included in the revised restatement.
The ALI has set out in a perilous new direction by sanctioning
this type of approach used by Henderson and Twerski as the
reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability project should have resulted in
an academic and scholarly product, reflective of the lofty standards
to which the ALI previously subscribed, and to which courts and
legislatures could turn with confidence in their efforts to reconcile
inconsistencies and conflicts in the law. However, this project,
infected as it was with reporter bias and improper influence, has
produced nothing more than a position paper reflecting the views
of special interests groups with whom the selected reporters are
aligned. The adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability by the ALI will come to be seen as a conscious
decision by that organization to alter its status in the legal
community, from well respected objective analyst to subjective
advocate. Once complete, that change will forever destroy the basis
of credibility upon which the influential works of the ALI rests, and
will relegate the ALI and its works to the level of amicus curiae in
the eyes of the legal community.
37. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 33 (5th ed. 1984). Even
an entire industry, by adopting careless methods to save time, effort, or money, cannot be
permitted to set its own uncontrolled standard. See id.
38. See Henderson's Redesign, supra note 34, at 2367 n.14; see also, Henderson, supra
note 31, at 118-20.
39. See Henderson, supra note 31, at 120. The risk spreading rationale disfavored by
Henderson is the social policy underlying the concept of strict liability, which states that a
manufacturer is in a better position to account for the risk of injuries by spreading the cost
of insurance across the entire line of his products. See id.
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SURVEY OF THE LAW OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN SELECTED
REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY

As previously stated, one of the ALI's principal reasons for
undertaking the restatement projects was to help to bring order to
the seemingly chaotic state of the law.40 The undertaking of a
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability would cause one
to assume that the state of strict products liability law in the
United States had degenerated into a state of chaos and disarray,
so as to prevent anyone from finding consistency among the
different jurisdictions. To dispel the notion that such a chaotic
situation exists, it is necessary to examine the present state of
strict products liability law throughout the United States.
To simplify the task, one jurisdiction from each of the geographic
regions of the country has been selected. This method should
amply account for the societal and cultural differences that are
hallmarks not only of the demographics of the United States, but
also of the different yet understandable approaches to the law that
exist within those regions.4" The jurisdictions chosen, and their
representative regions, are as follows: Alabama (The South
Region), 42 New Mexico (The Southwest Region)," Washington (The
Northwest Region)," Kansas (The Heartland Region), 45 Indiana (The
Midwest Region), 46 and Connecticut (The Northeast Region). 47 The
conclusion of this comment in every jurisdiction analyzed is that
the very cases cited and analyzed by the Restatement (Third)
reporters do not support its broad conclusion, typically because the
reporters rely on so-called crashworthiness cases to (improperly)
draw a conclusion for all design defect cases. Regrettably, a more
complete survey of American jurisprudence, one that would
duplicate the analysis contained in the Restatement (Third), is well
beyond the scope of this. comment. However, another commentator
undertook just such an effort in 1996, when the Restatement
(Third) was still in a proposed form, and after an exhaustive
40. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 925.
41. See
Lawrence
Schlam,
State Constututional Amending, Independent
Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43
DEPAuL L REv. 269 (1994).
42. See infra notes 68-106 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 107-27 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 146-75 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
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analysis, concluded that only eight jurisdictions in the United States
supported the conclusion of the Restatement (Third), that proof of
a reasonable alternative design is required in all design defect
48

cases.

A.

The Impact of the Crashworthiness Doctrine on
Restatement (Third)

the

Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability defines a defectively designed product as follows
A product . . . is defective in design when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe .

. .49

In a lengthy Reporters' Note following the comments to Section 2,
the reporters conducted a survey of the law of the several states
regarding the necessity to prove a reasonable alternative design in
a design defect case. This survey is divided into four categories:
FIRST are the jurisdictions that explicitly require a
plaintiff. . . to prove that a reasonable alternative design
would have reduced or avoided the plaintiff's harm. SECOND
48. See John F Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute
Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects - A Survey of
the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MER L REV. 493 (1996). Vargo's comprehensive
and inspiring article surveys the case law, statutes, and pattern jury instructions of the fifty
United States and the District of Columbia to determine what the relevant law regarding
design defects is. Id. at 501-02. Vargo concludes that only three jurisdictions have common
law support for the Restatement (Third) conclusion: Alabama, Maine, and Michigan. Id. at
536. (Note that this author disagrees with Vargo's conclusion regarding Alabama law; see
infra notes 68-106 and accompanying text.) Vargo adds that five other states have adopted
what he calls "anti-consumer statutes" that support the Restatement (Third) conclusion:
minois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, and Texas. Id. at 537. Vargo's principle critique of the
analysis of the state of design defect law in America is that the reporters "rely, to some
extent, on three types of authority which may or may not reflect the common law of a
particular jurisdiction: the co-reporters cite to legislation ... and to federal and intermediate
state appellate court decisions." Id. at 503. Thus, Vargo analyzes the law of each state
primarily according to the decisions of the state's highest court. Id. at 503-04.
This comment differs from Vargo's analysis in that this comment focuses on the reporters'
misuse of crashworthiness cases, and this comment criticizes the very law relied on by the
reporters, whether that law be in the form of statutes, federal cases, lower state appellate
courts, or high state appellate courts.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS. PRODuCTs LIABILrrY § 2b (1997).
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are the jurisdictions that apply a general risk-utility test for
defective design without explicitly requiring proof of a
reasonable alternative design. Recognition of a risk-utility
standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs
implicitly commits the court to the requirement of a
reasonable alternative design. THIRD are the jurisdictions that
purport to rely on a consumer expectation test but in fact
engage in a risk-utility analysis that, as with the SECOND
approach, implicitly commits the court to a reasonable
alternative design requirement. And FOURTH are the
jurisdictions, relatively few in number, that apply a true
consumer expectations test, independent of risk-utility,
without requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design .5°
In so categorizing the law of the several states regarding strict
products liability based on design defect, the reporters of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts relied on strict products liability
cases utilizing a particular type of design defect: the
crashworthiness doctrine.51 The crashworthiness doctrine grew out
of products liability claims against the automobile industry and

1

50. Id. at § 2 cmt. d, Reporters' Note at I, 46. The reporters list 23 jurisdictions
in their
first category (jurisdictions that explicitly require proof of a reasonable alternative design):
Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah,
West Virginia, Oregon, Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, and Ohio. Id.
at II-A, 46-65. The reporters list 10 jurisdictions in their second category (jurisdictions that
impliedly require proof of a. reasonable alternative design in a/! design defect cases, without
explicity doing so): Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id. at 11-B, 65-71. The reporters list 3 jurisdictions
in their third category (jurisdictions that impliedly require proof of a reasonable alternative
design in most design defect cases): Connecticut, Iowa, and Washington. Id. at II-C, 71-73.
Finally, the reporters list 8 jurisdictions in their fourth category (jurisdictions that do not
require proof of a reasonable alternative design): California, Tennessee, Alaska, Arkansas,
Hawaii, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. Id. at ll-D, 73-77.
51. See generally id. at § 2 cmt. d, Reporters' Note at 11-A through 11-C (citing to
crashworthiness cases for the position that a reasonable alternative design requirement is
already recognized as an element of a design defect case within the particular state's law).
Crashworthiness cases are sometimes referred to as second collision cases, or cases
involving enhanced injury, and this doctrine, in one basic form or another, has been adopted
in all fifty states. See R. Ben Hogan, The Crashworthiness Doctrine, 18 AM. J. OF TRIAL
ADvoc. 37 (1994). "The crashworthiness doctrine is merely a subset of a products liability
action pursuant to section 402A [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts], and usually arises in
the context of a vehicular accident." Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 644 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1994). "The crashworthiness doctrine provides that a manufacturer/seller is liable in
situations in which the defect did not cause the accident or initial impact, but rather
increased the severity of the injury over that which would have occurred absent the design
defect." Id. See also Mills v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.R.D. 271 (M.D. Pa 1990); Barris v. Bob's
Drag Chutes & Safety Equip., 685 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1982).
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requires any manufacturer to whom it applies to "take such steps
as may be reasonable and practicable to forestall particular crash
injuries and mitigate the seriousness of others." 2 The basic concept
underlying a crashworthiness (also known as a second collision)
cause of action is that manufacturers of products designed to be
occupied during movement must include collisions as a foreseeable
intended use of their products.5 That is, a manufacturer has a legal
duty to design and manufacture its product to be reasonably
crashworthy.54 Simply put, a "defect in a product that does not

cause the accident but does cause or enhance an injury is a
crashworthiness defect." 5
The need to establish a standard to determine the extent of such

legal a duty follows from the imposition of this duty. Many
manufacturers argue that they should not be held to a standard
that exceeds that subscribed to by the industry.5 This appeal to use
industry state-of-the-art as the applicable standard has been

dismissed by the courts as an improper standard. 57 In 1932, in the
seminal case of The TJ. Hooper,58 Judge Learned Hand dismissed
52. Hogan, supra note 51, at 41 n.17.
53. See Larsen v. General Motors, Inc., 391 F2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968). In this case the
plaintiff was injured when the steering column of his 1963 Corvair struck him in the chest
following a front end collision. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 496-97. The district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that General Motors had no duty to
manufacture an accident proof vehicle and would not be liable in cases where the alleged
defect did not cause the accident. Id. at 497. The circuit court reversed this ruling, stating
that under the present state of .the art, "an automobile manufacturer is under no duty to
design an accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle or even one that floats on water, but such
manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid
subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision." Id. at 502.
"Collisions with or without fault of the user are clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and
are statistically inevitable." Id.
54. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976). In analyzing the law of New
Jersey with respect to strict liability and its application to a case involving enhanced injuries
to a motorist caused by a second collision inside the vehicle with a defectively designed
headrest, the circuit court ruled,
[I]t was beyond peradventure that an automobile manufacturer today has some legal
obligation to design and produce a reasonably crashworthy vehicle. The court went on
to say that a manufacturer is not required to design against bizarre accidents, but the
manufacturer is required to take reasonable steps-within the limitations of cost,
technology, and marketability-to design and produce a vehicle that will minimize the
unavoidable danger. Rephrased in the terminology of strict liability, the manufacturer
must consider accidents as among the "intended" uses of its product.
Id. at 735.
55. Hogan, supra note 51, at 41.
56. See Larsen, 391 F2d at 503.
57. Id.
58. 60 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1932).
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that argument when he stated, "[I]ndeed, in most cases, reasonable
prudence is common prudence, but strictly it is never its
measure." 9 Applying this rationale to a case decided over forty
years after T J. Hooper, the Nebraska Supreme Court clarified the
issue by stating, "The question therefore is not whether anyone else
was doing more, although that may be considered, but whether the
6
evidence disclosed that anything more could be done." 0
To prevail in a design defect case brought under the
crashworthiness doctrine, a plaintiff must show that an alternative
design existed that would have been safer under the same
circumstances. 61 The plaintiff must also show that the defective
design caused injuries that would not have occurred had the
62
alternative design been incorporated.
Proving a reasonable alternative design in a crashworthiness case
imposes upon the plaintiff the burden of proving negligence on the
part of the vehicle manufacturer regarding its duty to design a
crashworthy vehicle. 3 Thus, for a plaintiff to prevail in a
crashworthiness cause of action, all of the elements of a negligence
cause of action must be proven. 64
The concept of strict liability is injected into a crashworthiness
59. TJ. Hooper, 60 F2d at 740. In this case, the judge found the tug "Hooper," and its
companion vessel, to be unseaworthy due to the lack of radio receiving equipment which
could have warned them of the impending storm which ultimately brought about their
demise at sea. T J. Hooper, 60 E2d at 740. Having been deemed unseaworthy, the owner of
the vessels was liable for the loss of both the barges the tugs were towing and their cargoes.
Id. The owner argued that the radio technology was new and that it had not been adopted
as standard equipment in the business at hand. Id. The court rejected this argument, stating
that it is the court that states what one's duty is, not the applicable industry itself. Id.
60. Hancock v. Pacar, 283 N.W2d 25, 35 (Neb. 1979). In an action seeking damages for
the death of her husband, the plaintiff asserted a claim against the manufacturer of the truck
that the decedent was driving. Hancock, 283 N.W.2d at 31. When the truck hit a deer, the
impact bent the front bumper of the truck in such a manner as to interfere with the steering
mechanism of the truck, causing the truck to veer out of control. Id. at 31. The plaintiff
alleged that the bumper was defectively designed by being made of inferior material, was
functionally misplaced and had insufficient support. Id. The defendant countered with the
argument that the bumper was the state-of-the-art in truck manufacturing. Id. at 34-35. The
court rejected this argument, stating that proof that no one in the industry is doing
something different does not establish state-of-the-art. Id.
61. Huddell, 537 E2d at 737.
62. Id. at 737-38.
63. See Anita Bernstein, The RepresentationalDialectic,87 CAL L REv. 305, 347 (1999).
64. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984). The
elements to a cause of action for negligence, (and the corresponding crashworthiness
elements), are duty, (the judicially imposed duty to manufacture a crashworthy vehicle),
breach, (failure to eliminate design defects that could cause forseeable injuries in a vehicle
collision), causation, (design defect caused enhanced injuries to the plaintiff), and damages.
Id.
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case subsequent to the required proof of a reasonable alternative
design.65 Once a manufacturer's design of the offending product has
been proven defective, the manufacturer is held strictly liable for
the damages caused by the product, regardless of the existence of
fault on the part of the vehicle operator in bringing about the initial
66
collision.
This concept of strict liability distinguishes a design defect case
brought under the crashworthiness doctrine from a design defect
case brought pursuant to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, where the defectively designed product was the initial and
sole cause of plaintiff's injuries.6 7 Having thus distinguished this
cause of action, it can be said that the reporters of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability were not justified in relying
upon crashworthiness cases to support a blanket conclusion that a
.particular state requires a plaintiff to prove the existence of a
reasonable alternative design in all design defect cases brought
under a theory of strict products liability.
B. The South Region: Alabama
In the state of Alabama, the courts have developed strict
products liability law over the past twenty-three years. In 1976, the
Alabama Supreme Court, in the seminal cases of Atkins v.
American Motors Corp.6 and Casrell v. Altec Industries,69 adopted
a modified version of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Although the court was reluctant to dispense with fault
notions, because it wanted to retain the causal nexus between the
manufacturer of the product and the defect, it did develop what the
65. See Hogan, supra note 51, at 43-44.
66. Id.
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toms § 402A (1968).
68. 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976). In Atkins, the plaintiff's decedent was killed in an AMC
Gremlin when the gas tank caught fire after the car was rear-ended by a Lincoln Continental.
Atkins, 335 So. 2d at 137. The plaintiff brought a products liability case under Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court adopted Section 402A
as the law in Alabama with respect to products liability, but refused to adopt it in its strict
liability form, preferring to modify the cause of action to effectively prevent a strict liability
cause of action against an intermediate seller of a product who was not causally connected
to the circumstances that brought about the defect in the product. Id. at 137.
69. 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976). This case was a companion case to Atkins. In this case,
decided under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, the plaintiff's
decedent was electrocuted when the boom arm of a "bucket truck" came in contact with
overhead electric power lines. CasreU, 335 So. 2d at 130. In imposing liability upon the seller
of the truck, the court attempted to distinguish negligence from strict liability by finding
negligence as a matter of law. Id. at 132. In effect, the application of such law by Alabama is
strict liability under assumed names normally associated with negligence. Id. at 131.
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Alabama judicial system consistently refers to as the "Alabama
Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine," the application of
which can only be described as strict liability.70 Thus, the only
defense available to manufacturers in future cases would exist in
their ability to show that the defect did not exist when the product
left their control. 71 However, Alabama does not allow a strict
liability action against an intermediate seller with no causal
connection to the circumstances of the injury.72 Under this version
of strict products liability law, injured plaintiffs seeking to impose
liability on intermediate wholesalers and retailers who were unable
to establish the necessary causal nexus with the defect, might still
be able to prosecute their cause of action based upon the implied
warranty of merchantability.73
The concept of "reasonable alternative design" was first
recognized by the Alabama courts during this period in the 1985
crashworthiness case of General Motors Corp. v. Edwards.741 In
Edwards, the alleged product defect was the design of the 1980
Chevrolet Chevette, which "placed [the gas tank] in the 'crush zone'
(betweeen the rear bumper and axle of the Chevette)." The
Edwards court required the plaintiffs to present evidence of "a
safer, practical, alternative design [that] was available to the
manufacturer at the time it manufactured the automobile;"
however, the court expressly limited, the application of the
reasonable alternative design requirement to cases of enhanced
injury or crashworthiness. 75 The concept of crashworthiness, as
70. Atkins, 335 So. 2d at 142. The public policy behind Alabama's law of strict products
liability is included in the development of the law by the courts. This policy supports the
conclusion that proving want of due care in products liability cases involving complicated
manufacturing processes can be almost impossible. The plaintiff in such cases should not be
forced to prove more than the mere placement on the market by the defendant of a product
not reasonably safe when used for its intended purpose and that, as a proximate result,
injury ensued. Id.
71. Id. at 143.
72. Id. at 143.
73. See ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(1) (1975) (stating that "[a] warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind").
74. 482 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985). Plaintiffs brought a products liability action based
upon a crashworthiness theory for personal injuries and the death of their two sons.
Edwards, 482 So. 2d at 1180. General Motors was named as a defendant as the manufacturer
of a Chevette automobile that burst into flames when struck from the rear by another
vehicle. Id. at 1180. A jury found GM liable for the deaths and the injuries under the
Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine. Id.
75. Edwards, 482 So. 2d at 1180, 1191. The Edwards court limited its holding to claims
"against an automobile manufacturer where it is alleged that an automobile manufactured by
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discussed previously, is particularly applicable to these types of
cases because the product, or its relative safety, is not generally
implicated as a cause of the initial accident; rather, the alleged
defect is the product's inability to protect its occupant in a
collision.76 The question of product safety, and thus manufacturer
liability, arises when the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the
accident would not have occurred, or would have been less
serious, if the product had not been defective.77 Such theories
logically impose on a plaintiff the burden of showing how the
product could have been manufactured or designed to have
78
eliminated the risk of enhanced injuries.
In 1990, a significant federal court ruling changed the direction of
the law in Alabama. In the case of Elliot-v. Brunswick Corp.,79 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overturned
the district court's judgment for the plaintiff in a strict products
liability case.80 The case involved an accident where a
fourteen-year-old boy jumped from a bridge and was seriously
injured by the propeller of a speed boat, manufactured by the
defendant. 81 The plaintiff argued that the propeller was defective by
offering an alternative design for the propeller that included a
propeller guard.8 2
On appeal, the circuit court ruled that the plaintiff had not
satisfied the consumer expectation test so as to prove that the
propeller was defective.83 As- to the alternative design offered by
the plaintiff, the court ruled that such a design was not feasible,
thereby precluding the establishment by the plaintiff of a claim
cognizable under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine.84 The federal court concluded, based upon its
it was defective, and was involved in an accident, and that the defect, although not causing
the accident to occur, contributed to the injuries sustained therein." Id. at 1191. This
limitation precisely describes the crashworthiness doctrine.
76. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the theory and
development of the crashworthiness cause of action, and its relevance to the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability.
77. Edwards, 482 So. 2d at 1189.
78. Id.
79. 903 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1990).
80. Elliot, 903 F. 2d at 1506.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1507. The consumer expectation test is designed to show that a product is
dangerous "beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. i (1968).
84. Elliot, 903 F.2d at 1507-10.
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interpretation of the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling in Edwards,
that Alabama law required the showing of a reasonable alternative
design in order to prevail in a design defect case.8 5 This was
however, an erroneous conclusion by the federal court, as the
Alabama Supreme Court's ruling in Edwards requiring proof of a
reasonable alternative design was limited to crashworthiness
86
cases.
The Alabama law with respect to strict products liability is an
anomaly. Its development with respect to the existence of a
reasonable alternative design requirement in all design defect cases
stems from the continuation of the erroneous holding of the
Eleventh Circuit in Elliot. It is possible that the Alabama case law
would allow a plaintiff to prevail in a design defect case without
proof of a reasonable alternative design. There is a consumer
expectation component to the adopted risk/utility test recognized
by the law of Alabama.87 This test has been developed over time,
mainly in the context of crashworthiness case.88 The adopted risk/
utility test is a balancing test, and a plaintiff need not satisfy all of
the cited criteria in order to tip the balance in his favor.89 Indeed,
85. Id. at 1510.
86. See Edwards, 482 So. 2d at 1189.
87. Flemister v. General Motors Corp., 723 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1998). This was a
crashworthiness case in which the plaintiffs decedent was killed when the Chevrolet Beretta
in which she was a passenger was struck in the passenger door by another vehicle.
F/emister, 723 So. 2d at 25. On appeal from the jury verdict in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff attacked the risk/utility test contained in'the Alabama Extended Manufacturers
Liability Doctrine, specifically the consumer expectation component, stating that in cases
such as these it is impossible for a reasonable consumer to form any expectations as to the
safety of an automobile. Id. at 27. The F/emister court rejected this argument, recognizing
the consumer expectation component of the risk/utility test adopted by the court in
Edwards. Id. at 28. The court concluded that the risk/utility test is a balancing test, and
proof of one component on balance may not always be sufficient. Id.
88. See Edwards, 482 So. 2d at 1188. The seven elements of the risk/utility test are:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole; (2) the safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury; (3) the availability of a
substitute product that would meet the same need and not be as unsafe; (4) the
manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility; (5) the
user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product; (6) the
user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; and (7) the
feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price
of the product.
89.

Id.

2000

Proof of Reasonable Alternative Design

1077

in all cases, the facts of the case will determine the results of the
balancing test. It is easy to conceive that there exists an
unreasonably dangerous product for which there is no safer
alternative design, and neither defendants nor courts could
reasonably dispute the argument that the lack of a safer alternative
design does not necessarily speak positively for the safety of the
chosen design.
The reporters of the Restatement (Third) rely upon several
crashworthiness cases when identifying Alabama as a state that
explicitly requires proof of alternative design for design defect
cases.90 They also cite other cases that are easily distinguished
from the traditional design defect case.91 In one of these, Vines v.
Beloit Corp.,92 the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product
was granted summary judgment on both failure to warn and design
defect theories.93 Regarding the failure to warn, the manufacturer
prevailed after the court ruled that the plaintiff's employer was a
sophisticated user and intermediary, and that the warnings
provided by the manufacturer under those circumstances were
adequate. 94 As to the alternative design offered by the plaintiff, the
court ruled that it amounted to a design that accomplished no
more than to incorporate the manufacturers safety
recommendations into the machine. 95 The court viewed this merely
90.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiABnnry § 2b cmt. d, Reporters' Note at
11-A (1997) (citing General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985), and
Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411 (Ala 1994)). The Reporters' Note to
comment d, which provides the background for the Restatement (Third) rules regarding
design defect cases, "is by far the longest Reporters' Note to any comment in this
Restatement, and therefore a special format is appropriate." Id. at cmt. d, Reporters' Note.
The reporters divided their notes to comment d into four sections: an introduction, a
summary of American case law on the test for defective design, a sunmary of
commentators' views on that case law, and a summary of American case law on specific
issues related to design defect cases. Id.
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LALnrrY § 2b, cmt. d, Reporters' Note at
1-A (1997) (citing Richards v. Michelin Tire Co., 21 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 1994), and Graham v.
Sprout-Waldron & Co., 657 So. 2d 868 (Ala. 1995)).
92. 631 So. 2d 1003 (Ala. 1994).
93. Vines, 631 So. 2d at 1003. An employee of Scott Paper Products was injured when
he became entangled in broken paper that was spinning on a high speed paper reel. Id. at
1004. The manufacturer had delivered the paper reel machine to Scott paper as a component
part to an unfinished system and had provided recommendations to the employer for the
inclusion of safety precautions upon installation of the machine at the plant. Id. at 1005. The
recommended precautions consisted of "safety color coding," "written safety warning," and
"warning signs" designed to prevent workers from approaching the spinning reel while it was
in operation. Id.
94. Id. at 1006.
95. Id.
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as a novel approach to the failure to warn cause of action, which
the court found unpersuasive. 96 This case does not stand for the
proposition that Alabama law requires proof of a reasonable
alternative design. The court concluded only that the plaintiff's
design defect claim was merely a novel twist of the facts used to
aggravate the allegations supporting his failure to warn claim.
The reporters found additional support for identifying Alabama
as explicitly requiring proof of an alternative design in the case of
Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp.9 Beech was a defective design
case brought by an eight-year-old swimmer who was "run over and
injured while swimming with his father near a boat powered by an
. . . outboard motor manufactured by [the defendant.]" The case
was brought in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama; that court certified questions to the Alabama
Supreme Court regarding whether the plaintiff had made out a case
of defective product when the only alleged defect was a design that
lacked a propeller guard. 98 The reporters rely on this case for the
broad proposition that lack of proof of a reasonable alternative
design is a bar to a cause of action for defective design in
Alabama. 99 Both the federal district court where this case was frst
brought, and the Alabama Supreme Court, found this case to be
factually equivalent to Elliot v. Brunswick.'°° The five certified
questions to the Alabama Supreme Court asked, in essence, that
the supreme court determine as a matter of law whether the
existence of an outboard motor without propeller guards was
sufficient to state a cause of action for a defective product. 0 1
The state supreme court, again relying on its previous ruling in
GMC v. Edwards,101 determined that a reasonable alternative design
was required in design defect cases."°3 In answering the questions
certified by the district court, the Alabama Supreme Court engaged
96. Id.
97. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS IABmLrrY § 2b cmt. d, Reporters' Note at
II-A (1997) (citing Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So. 2d 447 (Ala. 1991)).
98. Beech, 584 So. 2d at 447-49.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176; see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Edwards.
103. Beech, 584 So. 2d at 450. This case is a procedural enigma. Rather than decide the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district court certified questions to the
Alabama Supreme Court. Id. at 449. The questions themselves indicated that the case
presented an arguable question of fact over the existence of an alternative design, precluding
a grant of summary judgment. Id.
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in its own analysis of the risk/utility test and, citing Edwards as
controlling, decided that as a matter of law "there is no cause of
action [in Alabama] for failure to provide propeller guards on
pleasure boat outboard motors." 1°4 Accepting this approach in these
types of cases appears to go against the Alabama Supreme Court's
1998 ruling in Flemister v. General Motors Corp.,05 which
determined that the jury, not the court, should apply the risk/utility
balancing test to determine the existence of a feasible alternative
06
design.
From this discussion, the most that can be said about the ruling
in Beech is that the Alabama courts will not entertain an action for
strict liability based upon injuries caused by an outboard motor
without propeller guards. It is scant support for the broad
proposition put forth by the reporters in the Restatement (Third)
that Alabama is a state that explicitly requires proof of a
reasonable alternative design in design defect cases. The Alabama
case law cited and discussed in the Restatement (Third) simply
does not support this broad proposition.
C. The Southwest Region: New Mexico
In 1972, New Mexico adopted the law of strict products liability
as set forth in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
with the New Mexico Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Stang
v. Hertz Corp.07 The New Mexico courts developed the law of
strict products liability with strict adherence to the parameters of
Section 402A.108 Some minor variations on liability, mostly in cases
involving failure to warn of obvious dangers, were presented and
adopted by the courts. °9 However, the variations were eventually
104. Id. at 450.
105. 723 So. 2d 25 (Ala- 1998).
106. F/emister, 723 So. 2d at 25-27; see supra note 87 for a discussion of F-emister.
107. 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972). This case was a wrongful death action, brought against
the Hertz Rental company, for damages caused to the passenger of a rented vehicle when a
tire on the car blew out and caused an accident. Stang, 497 P.2d at 733. In reversing a lower
court finding that strict liability did not apply to this case, the New Mexico Supreme Court
adopted the concept of strict liability as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
court then applied the concept of strict liability to the facts of this case and determined that
there existed no basis to distinguish sellers of products from lessors of products regarding
liability for injuries caused by defects in such products. Id. at 735.
108. Id. at 737.
109. See Garrett v. Nissen, 498 P.2d 1359 (N.M. 1972) (holding that a trampoline was
not defective for failing to provide warnings as to its dangers when it was not otherwise
defectively manufactured, and user was an experienced gymnast who used trampoline
frequently), overruled by Klopp v. Wackenhut, 824 P.2d 293, 297 (N.M. 1992). See also
Skyhook v. Jasper, 560 P.2d 934 (N.M. 1977) (holding that a crane rig was not defective for
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overruled by subsequent decisions of the New Mexico Supreme
11 0
Court.
In 1995, in response to the growing debate over strict products
liability, and specifically design defect cases, the New Mexico
Supreme Court took the opportunity in Brooks v. Beech Aircraft
Corp."' to summarize and clarify the law of strict products liability
in New Mexico, with particular attention paid to design defect
cases."' The Brooks case involved the death of the pilot in the
crash of a private aircraft manufactured by the defendant."3 The
plaintiff alleged that the plane was defective both in the design of
the safety features for failing to install shoulder harness restraints,
which enhanced the pilots injuries in the crash and caused his
death.114 The action was brought in both negligence and strict
liability.11 5 In Brooks, the court outlined four policy choices
underlying the imposition of strict products liability." 6 Analyzing
the countervailing arguments of the defendant manufacturers and
weighing them against those four policies, the court concluded that
the benefits to society of maintaining strict products liability
11 7
outweighed the concerns set forth by manufacturers.
Defendants argued that there was a distinct difference between
manufacturing defects and design defects, and that fairness dictates
that negligence principles should govern the requirements of proof
in design defect cases." 8 Additionally, the court stated that the
want of available safety devices when the dangers involved in its use were obvious, known
to the users, and the rig contained adequate visible warnings of said dangers), overruled by
Klopp v. Wackenhut, 824 P.2d at 297.
110. See Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 824 P2d 293 (N.M. 1992) (overruling Garrett and
Skyhook Corp.).
111. 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995).
112. Brooks, 902 P.2d at 54.
113. Id. at 55.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 57. The court cited four primary policies supporting imposition of strict
products liability: (1) placing the cost of injuries caused by defective products on the
manufacturer, who is in a better position to pass the true product cost onto all distributors,
retailers, and consumers of the product; (2) relieving the injured plaintiff of onerous burden
of establishing the manufacturer's negligence; (3) providing full chain of supply protection;
and (4) in the interest of fairness, providing relief against the manufacturer who, while
perhaps innocent of negligence, cast a defective product into the stream, of commerce and
profited thereby. Id. at 57-58.
117. Brooks, 902 P.2d at 63.
118. Id. at 56. Beech argued that strict liability is an inappropriate standard to measure
a supplier's liability for design defects. Id. Beech argued further that the concept of design
defect may only be understood by reference to the manufacturer's conduct, and that
negligence must be the sole standard of liability to ensure the public of the availability of
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arguments surrounding the determination of the appropriate
standard for proving that a product was defective were moot,
considering the New Mexico strict products liability jury
instructions defining defective products." 9 The New Mexico jury
instructions contained three instructions, the third of which
includes a risk/utility component based upon the seven part
analysis of defective products as enunciated by Dean John Wade in
his article on the nature of strict products liability.120 In appropriate

circumstances, these instructions, including the risk/utility
component, are sufficient to allow the jury to focus attention on
evidence reflecting meritorious
choices made by the manufacturer
121

on alternative design.
The court, however, distinguished this risk/utility analysis from
the negligence based risk/utility analysis contained in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Proposed Draft

by stating, "It is not the conduct of the manufacturer or the
designer which is primarily in question, but rather the quality of the
end result; the product is the focus of the inquiry."122 Thus, while

maintaining the focus of liability on the product itself, the risk that
the public will be needlessly deprived of beneficial products for the
useful and beneficial products. Id. at 57.
119. Id. See SCRA 1986, CIV. UNI JuRY INST., 13-1401 to 13-1433 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
120. Brooks, 902 P.2d at 61. The jury is instructed first, "that a supplier's liability is
measured by 'an unreasonable risk of injury resulting from a condition of the product or
from a manner of its use;' " second, that "[als to either flaw or design . . . 'an unreasonable
risk of injury is a risk which a reasonably prudent person having full knowledge of the risk
would find unacceptable;' " and finally, "that in determining whether a product design poses
an unreasonable risk of injury, '[the jury] should consider the ability to eliminate the risk
without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.' "
Id. (citing John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L J. 825
(1973)).
These jury instructions are based on the seven factors created by Dean John Wade to
conduct a risk-benefit analysis in order to determine the defectiveness of a product. Id. at 61
n.2. Dean Wade's seven factors are as follows:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product; (2) the availability of other and
safer products to meet the same need; (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable
seriousness, i.e., "risk;" (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) the common knowledge
and normal expectation of the danger (particularly for established products; (6) the
avoidability of the danger by care in the use of the product (including the effect of
instructions or warnings); and (7) the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously
impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.
Id. at 61-62 n.2 (citing Wade, supra). Dean Wade, a "great torts scholar," completed the
Restatement (Second) of Torts when "the brilliant and indefatiguable" Professor William
Prosser resigned as its sole Reporter. See RESTATEMENT (THimD) OF ToRms: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
xv (1997).
121. Brooks, 902 P.2d at 62.
122. Id. at 63.
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sake of compensating injured victims will be minimized.'23 The
court went on to note, "[Iln most instances, the manufacturer will
be aware of the risks posed by any given design and the availability
of any alternative designs.' 24 The court concluded by stating,
"Given the risk-benefit calculation on which the jury is instructed
in New Mexico, and the policy considerations that favor strict
liability, we believe that it is logical and consistent to take the
2
same approach to design defects as to manufacturing flaws."'
In the latest restatement, Professor Henderson relies on Brooks
in making his assertion that the establishment of a risk/utility
analysis for design defect cases implicitly requires a plaintiff to
make a showing of a reasonable alternative design to prevail, by
requiring the court to conduct a risk-utility test. 126 Brooks does not
support such a conclusion. In fact, the Brooks court concludes that
only in those rare instances when the technology available at the
time of trial has advanced beyond that which was known at the
time of distribution will the risk utility component of the jury
instruction be applicable. In most other cases, product design
defects will be judged according to the standards applied in cases
alleging manufacturing defects. 127 Thus, citation to Brooks is
insufficient to conclude that New Mexico implicitly requires proof
of a reasonable alternative design in all design defect cases.
D. The Northwest Region: Washington
In the 1969 case of Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 28 the Washington
Supreme Court adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts as the law in Washington regarding strict products
liability. 29 The court extended Section 402A to design defect cases
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUTs IAABarrY § 2b cmt. d, Reporters' Note at
II-B, 70 (1997).
127. Brooks, 902 P.2d at 63.
128. 452 P2d 729 (Wash. 1969) (en banc).
129. Ulmer, 452 P.2d at 734. This was a case wherein the plaintiff proceeded on a
theory of strict liability, but the jury found for the defendant following a jury instruction
outlining negligence as required proof in the case. Id. at 730. The appellate court reversed,
noting,
Section 402A [of the Restatement Second of Torts] is in accord with the import of our
cases which have been decided upon a theory of breach of implied warranty and we
hereby adopt it as the law of this jurisdiction.
...
[Tihe plaintiff in this case did not choose to try her case on the theory that the
defendant was negligent in manufacturing the automobile and instead chose to rest
her case on a theory of strict liability, which [theory] is supported by our [prior]
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in the 1975 crashworthiness case of Seattle-First National Bank v.
Tabert.'1° In Tabert, the court set out its consumer expectation test
for determining the relative safety of a product in a design defect
13
case. '

Because this analysis contains elements of a risk/utility balancing
test, it has been compared to a negligence standard. However, the
Tabert court was clear in establishing its preference for the
retention of strict liability by requiring the focus of the analysis to
be on the product from the consumer's view, thereby eliminating
13 2
any manufacturing perspective.
In 1981, the Washington legislature passed the Products Liability
Act. 1m Reading this statute literally, it appears that it adopted a
negligence standard for strict products liability cases advanced on
design defect theories, and appears to require proof of a reasonable
alternative design; part of the statute states as follows:
A product is not reasonable safe as designed, if, at the time of
manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the
claimant's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those
harms, outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design
a product that would have prevented those harms and the
adverse effect that an alternative design that was practical and
feasible would have on the usefulness of the product . . . 3
decisions (although admittedly not expressed as such therein). The trial court erred in
giving instructions which tended to create, in the minds of the jury, the impression
that it was necessary that the plaintiff prove negligence.
Id. at 734-35.
130. 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975) (en banc). Therein, the court stated:
A product may be just as dangerous and capable of producing injury whether its
condition arises from a defect in design or from a defect in the manufacturing
process. While a manufacturing defect may be more easily identified or proved, a
design defect may produce an equally dangerous product The end result is the
same-a defective product for which strict liability should attach.
Id. at 776.
131. Id. at 779. Therein the court stated:
In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a number of
factors must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the
potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or
minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case. In other instances the nature
of the product or the nature of the claimed defect may make other factors relevant to
the issue.
Id.
132. Id.
133. WAsR REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.72-010 to 7.72-060 (West 1992).
134. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72-030(1)(a), Liability of Manufacturers (West 1992). The
section also provides five methods by which a plaintiff could prove that a product was
unreasonably dangerous. Id.

1084

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:1059

However, subsequent rulings by the state courts have not
interpreted the act so literally.
Proving a product is defective by presenting proof of a
reasonable alternative design had always been available to design
defect plaintiffs in Washington. However, based upon the
Washington Supreme Court decision in the case of Connor v.
Skagit Corp.,135 the plaintiff may prove that a product was
unreasonably dangerous by any number of acceptable methods,
including proof of a reasonable alternative design. Plaintiffs could
not prevail however, when the evidence of a reasonable alternative
design was insufficient and it was the only proof offered to
13 6
establish a defective product.
In deciding the 1985 case of Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances,
Co.,13 7 its first case under the new statute, the Washington Supreme
Court interpreted the language of the statute to comport with its
original holding in Tabert. The Tabert court held that a product is
not reasonably safe if it is unsafe beyond that which would
reasonably be contemplated by the ordinary consumer. 38 This
statutory interpretation by the court gave renewed viability to the
Connor decision following the adoption of the statute. 3 9 The court
stated that in light of the legislative intent to incorporate the
language of Tabert into the statute, subsequent rulings such as
Connor, that are in conformance with Tabert, would still govern
the outcome of strict products liability cases. 40 Therefore, although
reasonable alternative design is listed as one of several statutory
methods of proof in a design defect case, it is not the exclusive
method by which such cases may be proved.'
The reporters of the Restatement (Third) include the state of
Washington in a group of states that they categorize as applying a
"consumer expectation test" based upon a risk/utility analysis,
thereby implicitly requiring proof of a reasonable alternative
design. 42 The reporters characterize such states as falling into a
pattern of using consumer expectation rhetoric while applying risk/
135. 664 P.2d 1208 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
136. Connor, 664 P.2d at 1212.
137. 728 P.2d 585 (Wash. 1985) (en banc).
138. Couch, 728 P.2d at 589.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILIY § 2b cmt. d, Reporters' Note
at I-C (1997).
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utility as the appropriate analysis.'4
Although it has been overlooked by the reporters, in order to
understand the position of the Washington Supreme Court and its
analysis of design defect cases, one must be aware of the fact that
Tabert is first and foremost a crashworthiness case. It appears that
the Washington legislature included a reasonable alternative design
requirement in their strict products liability statute, and that its
inclusion was based on the ruling of the Washington Supreme
Court in Tabert.'" Nevertheless, subsequent cases have led the
Washington Supreme Court to interpret the statute to include
reasonable alternative design as just one way to prove such a
case. 45 Based upon these facts, it is reasonable to conclude that
the Washington Supreme Court may disagree with the reporter's
categorization of its law.
E.

The HeartlandRegion: Kansas

In the state of Kansas, the law of strict products liability is based
upon Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
Kansas Supreme Court adopted Section 402A in the 1976 case of
Brooks v. Deitz146 In determining the existence of a defective
product based upon a design defect theory, the Kansas Supreme
Court, in the case of Lester v. Magic Chef Inc.,14 adopted the
consumer expectation test as outlined in Section 402A comment (i)
as the proper standard. 148 The court also determined that a risk
utility balancing test was inapplicable.149 The court discussed and
explicitly rejected the applicability of the Barker test that had been
143. Id. at cmt. d, Reporters' Note, Part 11-C. The reporters rely on the Tabert case as
support for their conclusion. Id.
144. See WASi. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72-030 (West 1992); Tabert, 542 P.2d at 779.
145. See Couch, 728 P.2d. at 589.
146. 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976). The plaintiff in this case, an experienced plumber, was
injured while performing maintenance on a home furnace. Brooks, 542 P.2d at 1106. A
malfunctioning switch that controlled the gas supply had allowed an accumulation of gas
near the floor around the heater. Id. This gas exploded when the plaintiff attempted to work
on the heater. Id. The plaintiffs claims for injuries were submitted to the jury on both
negligence and strict liability theories, and the jury awarded over $250,000 in damages. Id.
The defendant appealed, arguing that there was no cause of action in strict liability in
Kansas. Id. This act by the court of adopting Section 402A was simply a formal recognition
of the legal basis upon which it had based its decisions in similar cases in the past. Id. at
1108.
147. 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982).
148. Lester, 641 P.2d at 361. In order for a product to be unreasonably dangerous under
the consumer expectation test, the article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Id.
149. Id.

1086

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:1059

developed in the California courts. 15°
Subsequent to its holding in Lester, the Kansas Supreme Court
seemed to expand its position as to what test to apply in the 1983
case of Siruta v. Hesston Corp.'5 ' There the court stated that, in
strict liability actions, a plaintiff may sustain his burden of proof
concerning design defects by showing the feasibility of a safer
design.' 52 The court resolved the apparent conflict between Siruta
and Lester concerning which test or tests applied to design defects
cases in Betts V. General Motors Corp.'5 Therein the court held
that in a design defect case, the proper jury instruction for whether
a design is unreasonably dangerous is the consumer expectation
test, and that evidence of a reasonable alternative design based
upon a risk/utility analysis is allowed but not required. 15
In 1981, Kansas adopted a comprehensive Products Liability Act
that severely limited consumers' rights by placing limitations on
consumer actions, including a statute of repose, and implementing
provisions regarding useful safe life.'5 It also provides for defenses
150. Id. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co. Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). The test developed
in Barker states:
[A] product may be found defective in design, so as to subject a manufacturer to
strict liability for resulting injuries, under either of two alternative tests. First, a
product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Second, a product may alternatively be
found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the
relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the
risk of danger inherent in such design.
Id at 455-56.
151. 659 P.2d 799 (Kan. 1983).
152. Siruta, 659 P.2d at 808. The plaintiff brought his case in strict liability against the
manufacturer of a hay baler. Id. at 801. While operating the defendant's machine, plaintiff's
arm was caught in the mechanism and severed after it entered the chute of the hay baler. Id.
The plaintiff sought to prove that the machine was unreasonably dangerous by offering
evidence that the defendant, after the occurrence of the relevant incident, incorporated the
plaintiff's proffered alternative design into its product Id. at 807. The defendant sought to
exclude the evidence as prohibited under the rules against admission of subsequent remedial
measures. Id. The court ruled that the evidence had not been presented to establish
negligence on the part of the defendant, but only to show that the design offered by the
plaintiff was feasible, and was therefore admissible for that purpose. Id. at 809.
153. 689 P2d 795 (Kan. 1984).
154. Id. at 801. The court concluded that jury instructions have nothing to do with the
evidence that may be offered at trial, and in a products liability action the parties may
present evidence on risk-utility, including feasibility of safer designs along with many other
factors. Id. Such evidence is allowed but not necessarily required in a design defect case,
and regardless of the evidence produced, the jury will receive a consumer expectation
instruction. Id.
155.

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3301 to 60-3307 (1994).
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based upon compliance with government standards, and a
state-of-the-art defense. '5 There are also limitations for
non-manufacturers and limitations on the manufacturer's duties,
including the duty to warn, and limitations for a seller's lack of
knowledge of a defect. 57 None of the provisions of the Act,
however, modify the rulings of the Kansas Supreme Court as to the
viability or applicability of the consumer expectation test in design
defect cases.
The reporters of the Restatement (Third) list Kansas among
those states that implicitly require proof of a reasonable alternative
design without explicitly doing so.15s They base this statement on
their conclusion that, under Betts, Kansas requires the application
of a risk/utility test in design defect cases.' 59 This appears to be a
rationalization on the part of the reporters to conform the court's
ruling to their preconceived notion of the proper proof in a design
defect case. The Betts court stated that in a design defect case, the
jury will be instructed on the consumer expectation test, but that
jury instructions have nothing to do with evidence offered at
trial.1 60 Therefore, it would be ludicrous to assume that the court
meant to require juries in design defect cases to be instructed on a
consumer expectation test, but then require plaintiffs to meet an
entirely different standard, the risk/utility test. Confusion would
certainly prevail over such proceedings.
The only rational interpretation of the court's ruling in Betts is
that the plaintiff in a design defect case must present evidence
sufficient to meet his burden under the consumer expectation test.
Thus, if he chooses, the plaintiff may submit evidence normally
presented to support elements of a risk/utility balancing test.
However, the court will not conform the appropriate test to the
evidence presented. Although a plaintiff can present any evidence
he wishes, including evidence of a reasonable alternative design, he
can prevail only if the evidence is sufficient to meet his burden
under a consumer expectation test.
In a case decided after the Restatement (Third) was published,
the Kansas Supreme Court explicitly rejected the requirement of a
reasonable alternative design as the standard of proof in a design
156.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304 (1994).

157. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306 (1994).
158. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABumrY § 2 cmt. d, Reporters' Note at

I-B, 68 (1997).
159. Id.
160. Betts, 689 P.2d at 801.
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defect case. In the case of Delaney v. Deere & Company,1 61 the
court summarized the development of the law of strict products
liability, and its conclusions were consistent with the foregoing
analysis of Kansas law.162 The basic issue in the case was whether a
defendant could escape liability under the Kansas Products Liability
Act' 63 for injuries caused by a defective machine when the danger
was patent and the manufacturer provided, and the plaintiff had
read, adequate warnings and instructions.1 64 The United States
District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment
for the defendant.16 The district court ruled that the Kansas statute
precluded the manufacturer's duty to warn of or protect against
patent hazards, and that comment (j) to Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts established "as a matter of law" that
providing adequate warnings would insulate a product from a
finding of defectiveness. 66 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was unable to synthesize the Kansas
rulings and certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court
for their disposition. 167 That court was asked to determine if
Section 60-3305(c) of the Kansas statute applied to both the duty to
warn and the duty to protect against hazards, and whether Kansas
adhered to comment (j) of Section 402A, or whether comment (1)
to Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts more accurately
reflected the law of Kansas on the subject.1 68
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that Section 60-3305(c) only
applied to the duty to warn.' 69 More importantly for the purposes of
this comment, the Kansas Supreme Court rejected both comment
(j) to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and
161.
162.

999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000).
Delaney, 999 P.2d at 934-35.

163.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3305(c) (1994).

164. Id. at 933. The plaintiff was injured when a round hay bale he was moving with
the defendant's tractor fell on him. Id. The plaintiff was using a home-made fork device
without a safety clip to lift the bale in direct contravention of the warnings and instructions
provided by the manufacturer and accompanying the tractor. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Comment j to 402A reads, "[W]here warning is given, the seller may reasonably
assume that it will be read and heeded: and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe
for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tom § 402A cmt j (1968). Comment I to Section 2 of the
Restatement (Third) states generally that adequate warnings and instructions will not save a
product from being found defective. See RESTATEMENT (THI-D) OF TOR: PRODUCTS LIABIITY §
2 cmt. 1 (1997).
169. Delaney, 999 P2d at 940.
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l70
comment (1) to Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
The court17 stated that it examined comment (1) and found it
"wanting."'
In rejecting comment (1), the court noted that
although comment (1) directly contradicted comment (j), adopting
comment (1) would implicitly import the concept of a reasonable
alternative design into the law of Kansas. 172 The court concluded by
stating unequivocally that, in the state of Kansas, the determination
of the existence of a defectively designed product is judged
exclusively by the consumer expectation test. 173
The reporters for the Restatement (Third) got Kansas dead
wrong when it placed that state in the category of states that
implicitly require proof of a reasonable alternative design without
explicitly doing So.174 The reporters should not be put to task for
the Delaney court's clarification of Kansas law, because Delaney
was decided after the Restatement (Third) was published.
However, the Delaney court relies on prior Kansas case law when
stating that "Kansas has consistently held that evidence of a
reasonable alternative design may [be] but is not required to be
175
introduced in a design defect action."

F

The Midwest Region: Indiana

The law of strict products liability in Indiana was slow to
develop due to relative inaction by the Indiana Supreme Court. In
1970, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in the case of Cornette v. Searjeant
Metal Products, Inc.176 Up until this point, the court had relied on
the federal courts and lower state courts to develop its law. Prior
to Cornette, the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in the 1966 crashworthiness case of Evans v.
170. Id. at 942-44.
171. Id. at 946.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LABnurY § 2 cmt. d, Reporters' Note at
f1-B, 68 (1997).
175. Delaney, 999 P.2d at 945 (citing Betts, 689 P.2d at 795, and Jenkins v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 886 P2d 869 (Kan. 1994)).
176. 258 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. 1970). This case was brought on a theory of strict liability
alleging a defect in a press machine. Cornette, 258 N.E. 2d at 654. Although the court found
for the defendant based on an assumption of the risk defense, it proceeded to distinguish
between causes of action based upon breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability. Id.
at 655. The court concluded that the soundness of its principles supported the adoption of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the basis for the law of strict liability
in Indiana. Id. at 656.
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General Motors Corp.7 7 had significant influence in directing the
Indiana courts in the development of its law on strict products
liability. 78 Subsequent cases decided by the Indiana Supreme Court
revolved around the issue of the "open and obvious danger," which
the Evans court found to be significant to its ultimate ruling that
an automobile manufacturer did not have a duty to foresee that its
product would be used to collide with other vehicles. 179 The court
concluded that collisions were an open and obvious danger that
should be avoided by the user of the product 18 0 This influence
continued to be viable even after the 1978 enactment of Indiana's
strict products liability statute, as evidenced by appellate court
rulings relying on the open and obvious danger rule as developed
8
by the federal courts sitting in diversity cases.' '
The law in Indiana took a dramatic turn in 1978 with the
adoption of a products liability statute and the Indiana Supreme
Court's ruling in the case of Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co. 8 2
In Koske, the supreme court ruled that the Indiana products
liability statute preempted the field of strict liability in tort, and
thus overruled previously recognized common law doctrines that
conflicted with the statute.1 83 In the case of Miller v. Todd, which
followed closely on the heels of Koske, the Indiana Supreme Court
effectively negated the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Evans by
recognizing the viability of a cause of action based on enhanced
injury, crashworthiness, and second collision.1ls
Under the Indiana products liability statute, the proper test to
determine the existence of an unreasonably dangerous product is
the "consumer expectation test."8 5 The Indiana products liability
177. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
178. Cornette, 258 N.E.2d at 655-56. In Evans, the court determined that the defendants
could not be held liable for injuries caused by a defectively designed automobile as a result
of a second collision. Evans, 359 F.2d at 825.
179. Evans, 359 F 2d at 824.
180. Id.
181. See Benis Co. Inc. v. Rubush, 427 N.E.2d 1058, 1061-64 (Ind. 1981) (citing Burton
v. Smith Foundry, 529 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1976); and Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560
(7th Cir. 1969)). According to the court, the open and obvious danger rule precluded liability
of the defendant under either negligence or strict liability unless the plaintiff could show that
the defect was "hidden and not normally observable, constituting a latent danger." Id. at
1061.
182. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-20-1-1 to 34-20-9-1 (Lexis 1998); 551 N.E.2d 437 (Ind.
1990).
183. Koske, 551 N.E.2d at 443.
184. 551 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1990).
185. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-4-1 (Lexis 1998), which states as follows:
A product is in a defective condition under this article if, at the time it is conveyed by
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statute has a separate section governing design defect cases, and
although that section modifies the rule of strict liability as it is
expressed for manufacturing defects, it does not expressly require
86
proof of a reasonable design alternative in all design defect cases.
The requirement of proving a reasonable alternative design in a
design defect case in Indiana is only present in the cases brought
187
under the theories of crashworthiness and second collisions.
The restatement reporters take the position that the law in
Indiana explicitly requires proof of a reasonable alternative design
for design defect caseslas This conclusion is based exclusively on
Indiana case law developed in the area of crashworthiness, and not
on the Indiana products liability statute, which preempts prior
conflicting case law.189 As was seen in the previous discussion of
this particular cause of action, proof of reasonable alternative
the seller to another party, it is in a condition:
(1) not contemplated by reasonable persons among those considered expected
users or consumers of the product; and
(2) that will be unreasonably dangerous to the expected user or consumer when
used in reasonably expectable ways of handling or consumption.
Id.; see Welch v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 651 N.E.2d 810 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (interpreting this
section). "The requirement that the product be in a defective condition focuses on the
product itself while the requirement that the product be unreasonably dangerous focuses on
the reasonable expectations of the consumer." Welch, 651 N.E.2d at 814.
186. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-2-2 (Lexis 1998), which states in its entirety as follows:
The rule stated [above, dealing with strict liability for manufacturing defectsj applies
although:
(1) the seller has exercised all reasonable care in the manufacture and
preparation of
the product; and
(2) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
However, in an action based on an alleged design defect in the product or based on
an alleged failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions regarding the use of
the product, the party making the claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller
failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product or
in providing the warnings or instructions.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the statute appears to return design defect (and warning defect)
cases to the realm of negligence. However, this does not necessarily mean that a design
defect plaintiff must produce evidence of a reasonable alternative design; arguably there may
be other ways to establish the defendant's breach of the duty of reasonable care during a
product's design. Therefore, it was misleading for the reporters of the Restatement (Third)
to classify Indiana as a state that requires proof of a reasonable alternative design in all
design defect cases.
187. See Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1990); Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d
1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LiABitry § 2 cmt. d, Reporters' Note at
11-A, 49 (1997).
189. Id.
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design has always been a requirement in crashworthiness cases. 190
To infer from this, in the face of contrary statutes and interpretive
case law, that the law of Indiana requires such proof in all strict
products liability cases alleging design defect, is deceptively
misleading.
G. The Northeast Region: Connecticut

The Connecticut Supreme Court adopted Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts as the basis for strict products
liability in the 1965 case of Garthwait v. Burgio. 91 In a subsequent
case, Slepski v. Williams Ford Inc.,

92

the court determined that in

a strict products liability case alleging a design defect, the proper
test to apply to determine whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous was the consumer expectation test. 93
Subsequent to the court's decisions in the previously cited cases,
the Connecticut legislature adopted several statutes designed to
impact the rights of consumers in cases involving strict products
liability. 94 However, none of the statutes passed in Connecticut
have had the effect of undermining the common law cases of strict
products liability, and as such, the standards for proving both
defectiveness and unreasonably dangerous remain the same.
The Connecticut Superior Court most recently reaffirmed
Connecticut's adherence to the consumer expectation test in strict
190. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the theory and
development of the crashworthiness cause of action, and its relevance to the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability.
191. 216 A-2d 189 (Conn. 1965). This was an action for breach of warranty to recover
for injuries incurred by the plaintiff as the result of an application of hair dye at a beauty
parlor. Garthwait, 216 A.2d at 190. The defendant sought to defend on the basis that the
plaintiff lacked contractual privity to assert the breach. Id. at 191. The court, adopting
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, stated that it saw no reason to require
contractual privity in actions sounding in tort and alleging personal injuries. Id. at 192.
192. 364 A.2d 175, 178 (Conn. 1975).
193. Slepski, 364 A-2d at 178. Slepski was an action to recover for injuries resulting
from a vehicle accident caused by a failure of the steering mechanism in a used vehicle.
Slepski, 364 A.2d at 177. The court ruled that the determination of whether the product was
unreasonably dangerous was a question of fact for the jury, and the standard to be applied
was the consumer expectation test. Id. at 178. That test states as follows:
[T]o be considered unreasonably dangerous for purposes of imposing strict liability on
a seller of a product for physical harm to the user or consumer, the article sold must
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF ToRS § 402A cmt. i (1968)).
194. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577(a) (West 1991) (statute of repose); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West 1991) (limitation on punitive damage awards); and CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-572(q) (West 1991) (requiring proof of negligence in "failure to warn" cases).
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products liability cases in the case of Stevens v. Romer.'95 Prior to
Stevens, the Connecticut Supreme Court had expressly rejected the
requirement of a reasonable alternative design in design defect
96
cases in the case of Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.'
The restatement reporters strain to include Connecticut in the
group of states that explicitly state that the proper test to be
applied in a design defect case is the consumer expectation test,
but that, according to the reporters, actually utilize a risk/utility
test, which, again according to the reporters, implies the necessity
of a finding of a reasonable alternative design.' 9 The reporters infer
from the mere mention of risk/utility within the leading Connecticut
cases that proof of a reasonable alternative design is (implicitly)
98
required in all design defect cases in that jurisdiction.
On the contrary, when commenting on the proper test to be
applied in a design defect case, the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Potter stated, "The ordinary consumer expectation test is
appropriate when the everyday experience of the particular
product's users permits the inference that the product did not meet
minimum safety expectations."'9 9 The court did, however, recognize
a modified test in those cases where complex machinery was the
product at issue and ordinary consumers may not have been in a
position to form any expectations as to the performance of such a
machine. The Potter court stated that in such cases, "The jury
should engage in the risk-utility balancing required by our modified
consumer expectation test when the particular facts do not
reasonably permit the inference that the product did not meet the
195. 1999 WL 195958, at *2 (Conn. Super. Mar. 24, 1999). The plaintiff herein had
brought a claim under a theory of strict products liability, after the defendant pharmacy had
provided him with the wrong prescription drug. Id. at *1. The defendant sought to strike the
plaintiff's complaint as failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, asserting
that although the plaintiff had been given the wrong drug, the drug he received was not
defective. Id. at *2. Applying the consumer expectation test, the court stated that the plaintiff
could have expected to receive the proper drug and thus the improper drug was defective to
the extent that it undermined the plaintiff's reasonable expectations that it was the proper
drug. Id. at *3.
196. 694 A-2d 1319 (Conn. 1997). Therein the court stated, "The defendants propose
that it is time for this court to abandon the consumer expectation standard and adopt the
requirement that the plaintiff must prove the existence of a reasonable alternative design in
order to prevail on a design defect claim. We decline to accept the defendants' invitation."
Id. at 1331 (emphasis added).
197. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS iABurrY § 2 cmt. d, Reporters' Note at
1-C, 71-72 (1997).
198. Id.
199. Potter, 694 A.2d at 1333.
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safety expectations of the ordinary consumer."2(E Regardless of
having adopted such a modified test, the court emphasized that it
was not abrogating the general consumer expectation test in design
defect cases by stating, "There are certain kinds of accidents even where fairly complex machinery is involved - [that] are so
bizarre that the average juror, upon hearing the particulars, might
reasonably think: 'Whatever the user may have expected from that
contraption, it certainly wasn't that.' "201
The rationalizations of the restatement reporters with respect to
the law of Connecticut seems to be an attempt to construct a hole
designed to accept the legal peg fashioned by the Potter court. The
Potter decision means what it says: a risk/utility balancing test is
appropriate in some design defect cases, namely those involving
products beyond the experience of an ordinary consumer. This
does not in any way infer that Connecticut requires proof of a
reasonable alternative design in all design defect cases.

III.

THE LAW OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN PENNSYLVANIA

Strict products liability law in Pennsylvania stands virtually alone
in its uncompromising adherence to the original concept of strict
liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
In 1966, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the law of strict
liability, as outlined in Section 402A, in the seminal case of Webb v.
Zern.2°2 Since that time, there have been several significant rulings
rejecting negligence principles and cementing the concept of strict
products liability in Pennsylvania In the 1975 case of Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 2 3 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that "the reitsonable man standard, in any form, has no place in
strict liability."2°4 In the 1978 case of Azzarello v. Black Brothers
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966). This case arises from the explosion of a beer keg. Webb,
220 A.2d at 854. The keg had been tapped and placed in a room, and persons had extracted
approximately one gallon of beer from the keg. Id. When the plaintiff entered the room, the
keg inexplicably exploded, causing serious injuries to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff had
proceeded on a res ipsa loquitor negligence theory because it was impossible to determine
precisely what had caused the explosion. Id. The trial court granted the defendants
demurrer and dismissed, citing the failure of the plaintiff to join both his brother and father
who had an opportunity to control the keg, and the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and acknowledged that the plaintiff had plead
his case broadly enough to have stated a claim under the newly adopted strict products
liability theory of defective products as stated in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. Id. at 854.
203. 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975).
204. Berkebile, 337 A-2d at 899. The court explained, "[wie recognize that the words
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Co., Inc., 20 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced the
underlying social policy upon which it based its view of
manufacturers as guarantors of the safety of their products.20 6 The
court stated:
Today a manufacturer is effectively the guarantor of his
product's safety. Our courts have determined that a
manufacturer, by marketing and advertising his product,
impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use. We
have decided that no current societal interest is served by
permitting the manufacturer to place a defective article in the
stream of commerce and then to avoid responsibility for
20 7
damages caused by the defect.
This policy does not, however, make the manufacturer of a product
20 8
an insurer of the product's safety.
With respect to the law of strict products liability in
Pennsylvania, the AzzareUo decision has created much confusion
over the application of a risk/utility balancing test and the
requirement of proof in the form of a reasonable alternative design.
For one to understand the present state of the law of strict
'unreasonably dangerous' may serve the beneficial purpose of preventing the seller from
being treated as the insurer of its products. However, we think that such protective end is
attained by the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the manufacture or design of
the product, and that such defect was a proximate cause of the injuries." Id. at 900 (quoting
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal. 1972)).
205. 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa- 1978).
206. AzzareUo, 391 A.2d at 1026. Plaintiff was injured when she caught her hand in the
rollers of a coating machine at work. Id. at 1022. She sued the manufacturer under a strict
liability theory, citing Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. The
manufacturer joined the plaintiff's employer as an additional defendant, claiming that the
employer's negligence caused the injury. Id. Following jury instructions, which focused on
the "unreasonably dangerous" language in Section 402A, the jury found the manufacturer was
not liable and the employer was liable, and awarded the plaintiff $125,000. Id. The plaintiff
moved for a new trial, which was granted based on an intervening opinion of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which banned the use of negligence principles in a strict
liability case. Id. at 1023. The manufacturer appealed and the superior court affirmed the
grant of a new trial. Id. The supreme court ruled that the use of the words "unreasonably
dangerous" in jury instructions in a strict liability context was misleading, and inappropriate
to the proper determination of the jury regarding the defectiveness of a product. Id. at 1027.
207. Id. at 1026 (quoting Salvador v. Atlantic Boiler Co., 319 A.2d at 907).
208. Id. at 1024. The distinction between guarantor and insurer lies in the proof
required of the plaintiff. It is insufficient for the plaintiff to simply show that he used the
product and was injured. Id. at 1024, n.5. Such a standard would make the manufacturer an
insurer of its product. Id. In order to prevail under Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the plaintiff must prove that the product was unsafe in some way. Id. See
supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the manufacturer-as-guarantor
policy that underlies the theory of strict products liability.
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products liability in Pennsylvania, one must understand the
supreme court's holding in Azzarello.
In AzzareUo, the court adopted a requirement that a trial court
conduct a risk/utility balancing of the plaintiff's averments of fact
in order to make a threshold determination of the viability of its
strict products liability claim.20 9 By inference, this requirement
would seem to require all plaintiffs to submit proof of a reasonable
alternative design in all design defect cases. However, the AzzareUo
ruling did not propose to establish a standard of proof in design
defect cases.21 0 The purpose of the risk/utility balancing test
enunciated in Azzarello is to ensure that the social policy rejecting
the position of manufacturer as insurer of its product is not
violated.21 1 Subsequent court rulings have clarified the AzzareUo
ruling by limiting it to those cases in which the minds of
reasonable people could not differ on whether the risks posed by a
212
product outweigh its utility.
In the case of Dambacher v. MaUis, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court ruled that the trial court need not proceed to a social policy
determination under Azzarello, absent a specific request by the
defendant, and the absence of such a determination on the record
would amount to a presumption by a reviewing court that the
resolution of that question was against the defendant. 2 3 Thus, the
purpose of the Azzarello balancing test is to prevent a plaintiff
from seeking damages for injuries caused by a product, where the
granting of relief would amount to placing the manufacturer in a
position of insurer. The most obvious example of such a scenario
would be a plaintiff suing the manufacturer for injuries caused by a
knife while he was in the process of slicing a tomato. The ruling in
209. Id. at 1026.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1024-25.
212. Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A.2d 408, 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (citing O'Brien v.
Muskin Corp., 463 N2d 298 (N.J. 1983)). In Dambacher, the plaintiff was injured as a
passenger in a vehicle that slid off the road in a rainstorm. Dambacher, 485 A-2d at 412. She
sued the seller of the radial tires used on the vehicle in strict liability for failure to warn
against the dangers inherent in mixing radial and non-radial tires. Id. at 411. On appeal from
the jury verdict against it, the seller averred that the trial court, applying the rule established
by the court in AzzareUo, should have proceeded to determine whether the lack of warnings
on the tires rendered the product "unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 420. In rejecting this
argument, the court stated that, under AzzareUo, the trial court should determine whether
the proffered evidence would support a finding by the jury that the tire was defective,
however, it did not follow that such a finding should lead to a conclusion by the court that
the tire was or was not defective. Id.
213. Dambacher, 485 A.2d at 422.
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Azzarello does not speak of the proof required of a plaintiff in
establishing the defectiveness of a product once the social policy
21 4
distinction mandated by Azzarello has been made.
Support for this view of the limited application of Azzarello can
be found in the fact that even after Azzarello, the Pennsylvania
courts have continually and consistently applied a consumer
215
expectation test as the basis of liability in a design defect case.
The only Pennsylvania cases recognizing a requirement for a
showing of a reasonable alternative design are those that advance a
claim under a crashworthiness or second collision theory of
liability.216
In the case of Surace v. Caterpillar,Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on Azzarello when it
predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt the
seven point analysis of Dean John Wade and allow for recovery in
a strict products liability case prosecuted on a design defect theory
based upon a risk-utility analysis. 217 In that case, the court extended
214. AzzareUo, 391 A.2d at 1024.
215. Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 545 A.2d 906 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (citing Sherk
v. Daisy-Heddon, 427 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)). E//is involved an action for
damages arising out of the death of plaintiff's husband, which occurred when irregular
shaped steel plates being loaded onto a barge fell on top of him. E//is, 545 A.2d at 907. The
plaintiff alleged that the plates were defectively designed in that they lacked sufficient
warnings or instructions concerning the danger inherent in handling the objects. Id. at 908.
The court held that in a failure to warn situation, it is only necessary to warn of latent
dangers, and that the application of the consumer expectation test as to open and obvious
dangers would result in a finding that a product was not defective. Id. at 912.
216. See Kupetz v. Deere & Co. Inc., 644 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). See also
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). In order to prevail on a crashworthiness theory
in a products liability action under Section 402A, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the
design of the vehicle was defective and that when the design was made, an alternative, safer
design practicable under the circumstances existed; (2) what injuries, if any, would have
resulted to the plaintiff had the alternative, safer design, in fact, been used; and (3) some
method of establishing the extent of plaintiffs enhanced injuries attributable to the defective
design. Kupetz, 644 A.2d at 1218.
217. 111 F.3d 1039 (3d Cir. 1997). The seven points of consideration proposed by Dean
Wade are as follows:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole; (2) the safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury; (3) the availability of a
substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe; (4) the
manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the. product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility; (5) the
user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product; (6) the
user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instruction; and (7) the feasibility,
on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by adjusting the price of the
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the scope of Azzarelto when it not only applied the risk/utility
analysis to make a threshold determination as to the applicability
of the recognized social policy regarding strict products liability,
but also applied it to the proof of a reasonable alternative design
offered by the plaintiff to support his theory of defect. 18 However,
such an application of the AzzareUo rule may not prove acceptable
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a subsequent case. The court
of appeals recognized this possibility when it took notice of the
fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet spoken
directly to this issue.1 9 As of now, it is not clear whether a
plaintiff's strict products liability claim, advanced on a theory of
design defect and supported by proof of a reasonable alternative
design, would be subjected to a risk/utility analysis as predicted by
the Third Circuit, or whether such proof would be judged on its
220
sufficiency to pass muster under a consumer expectation test.
The Restatement (Third) reporters include Pennsylvania in the
group of states that explicitly require proof of reasonable
alternative design. 221 The reporters find support for this conclusion
exclusively in the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts ruling in
Azzarello. 222 They cite to three additional cases as evidence of the
application of the Azzarello rule to require proof of a reasonable
223
alternative design in a design defect case.
224
The first case the reporters cite is Fitzpatrick v. Madonna.
However, reliance on this case to support their position is
misguided, and is evidence of the reporters' misunderstanding of
the purpose of the AzzareUo ruling. In Fitzpatrick, the
product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. at 1046 (quoting Daumbacher v. Mallis, 485 A-2d 408, 423 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (citing
John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L J. 825, 837-38
(1973))).
218. Id. at 1053.
219. Id. at 1051.
220. Id. at 1042.
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABiLrry § 2 cmt. d, Reporters' Note at
11-A, 57 (1997).
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 623 A2d 322 (Pa Super. Ct. 1993); Surace v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F3d 1039 (3d Cir. 1997); and Defrancesco v. Excam, Inc., 642 A.2d 529
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)).
224. 623 A.2d 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). In this case, plaintiffs decedent was killed
when struck by the propeller of a motor boat while swimming. Fitzpatrick, 623 A-2d at 323.
The court, conducting the test established in the Azzarello case, used a risk/utility analysis
to determine that the propeller was not defective, and held that to allow the plaintiff to
recover on the proffered evidence would make the manufacturer liable for any damages
caused by the propeller. Id. at 326.
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Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision to
dismiss the plaintiff's design defect claim against the maker of an
outboard motor as violative of the social policy underlying the law
of strict products liability after it conducted the Azzarello risk/
utility balancing test. 2 5 The court did not determine whether the
proof of product defectiveness offered by the plaintiff was
sufficient to support such a finding if the case had been presented
to a jury.226 This case illustrates the proper application of the rule
of Azzarello.
The second case cited by the reporters is the case of Surace v.
Caterpillar,Inc.227 This case was discussed above, and the ruling in
Surace is dubious support for the conclusion reached by the
reporters due to the Surace court's expanded application of the
rule of Azzarello.
The third case cited by the reporters is Defrancesco v. Excam,
Inc.228 In Defrancesco, the Pennsylvania Superior Court clearly
rejected the argument that the Azarello risk/utility analysis implied
the requirement of proof of a reasonable alternative design.229
Based upon this ruling, the reporters attempt to make a hairline
distinction between the standard identifying a design defect and the
230
variety of proof the plaintiff must introduce to prove that defect.
They infer from this distinction that Defrancesco "supports, rather
than contradicts," the requirement that the plaintiff show a
reasonable alternative design in a Pennsylvania design defect
case. 23 1 Contrary to this conclusion, the court in Defrancesco was
225. Id. at 327.
226. Id.
227. Surace, 111 F3d at 1039.
228. 642 A.2d 529 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). In Defrancesco, the plaintiff was injured when
the derringer pistol he was carrying in his sweater pocket accidentally discharged when the
hammer struck a box as he bent over. Id. at 530. The plaintiff asserted, through his expert
witnesses, that the weapon was defective because it was possible to discharge the weapon
by striking the hammer when it was resting against the breach, and that it was possible to
place the hammer in a pseudo half-cocked position such that sufficient pressure on the
safety would cause the hammer to fall and the weapon to discharge. Id. Following a jury
verdict, the defendants appealed stating that the plaintiff had failed to prove defectiveness by
failing to present proper evidence of a reasonable alternative design which was feasible. Id.
The court rejected this argument stating that such proof was not required in Pennsylvania.
Id. at 531.
229. Defrancesco, 642 A2d at 531.
230. RESTATEMENT THIRD OF ToRmS: PRODUm LIABirrY, § 2 cmt. d, Reporters' Note at
II-A, 57 .(1997). "In evaluating Pennsylvania cases, one must be careful to distinguish the
standard for identifying design defects from the variety of proof that the plaintiff must
introduce, through expert testimony, to establish a breach of that standard." Id.
231. Id.
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clear in its holding that such proof was not required. 232
The forgoing discussion of the Pennsylvania law seriously
undermines the reporters' conclusion that this jurisdiction requires
proof of a reasonable alternative design in all design defect cases.
The reporters go to great lengths to isolate statements made by the
Pennsylvania courts regarding the use of a risk/utility balancing test
in their analysis of cases under Azzarello. Using these isolated
statements, they then proceed to construct a complex inferential
analysis to create support for their position. In doing so, they
overlook the clear and obvious pronouncements of the
Pennsylvania courts, which are contrary to such a conclusion.
Pennsylvania has staunchly maintained the separation of
negligence principles and strict products liability law; it is a
disservice to the Pennsylvania appellate courts that the reporters of
the Restatement (Third) ignore this effort and categorize
Pennsylvania as a jurisdiction that explicitly requires proof of a
reasonable alternative design in all design defect cases.
CONCLUSION

The fallacy of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability is its conclusion, drawn from a survey found in the
Reporters' Notes to comment (d) of Section 2, that the majority of
jurisdictions in the United States already require (either expressly
or impliedly) proof of a reasonable alternative design in all design
defect cases. There is no doubt that some jurisdictions would allow
the introduction of evidence of a reasonable alternative design to
prove design defect in strict products liability cases. In fact, many,
if not all, jurisdictions would actually require such proof in certain
cases, such as in crashworthiness cases. However, it does not
follow that such jurisdictions require such proof in all design
defect cases. It is undeniable that the concept of a reasonable
alternative design is based in the law of negligence, and as such its
inclusion into the law of strict products liability undermines the
social policy embodied in the theory of strict liability of
manufacturer-as-guarantor.
232. Defrancesco, 642 A.2d at 531. The court stated, "We have held that in a defective
design case, the question is whether the product could have been designed more safely." Id.
The court continued, "Although appellants suggest that current Pennsylvania law requires a
plaintiff to make a showing of a reasonable alternative design based upon a risk/utility
analysis, such a suggestion was error as Pennsylvania has not imposed such rigorous
restriction in strict liability cases." Id.
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The law of strict products liability is undergoing a continuous
assault as competing forces seek to bolster their positions on the
issues. By seeking court decisions that favor their arguments,
special interest advocates hope to amass a body of precedent law
sufficient to overcome further resistance to their desired changes.
In dealing with such cases, the courts have attempted to maintain a
logical and fair method of resolving individual claims, while still
maintaining adherence to the basis of the law in their jurisdictions.
The basis of that law in most jurisdictions today is still Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The reporters of the Restatement (Third) took the position that
the law of strict products liability was in such a state as to require
the aid of the ALI to restate the law and create cohesion among
the jurisdictions. In undertaking this endeavor, they engaged in
rhetorical license and analytical legerdemain to arrive at the
conclusion that a majority of jurisdictions in this country now
require plaintiffs to produce evidence of a reasonable alternative
design before they can recover on claims of defectively designed
products on a theory of strict products liability. As has been
demonstrated by this discussion, one could find strong support in
the very same case law reviewed by the reporters that such is not
the case. The reporters of the Restatement (Third) have engaged in
a lengthy research and writing project purporting to restate the law
of products liability, but have succeeded in producing nothing more
than an extensive brief in support of their personal views.
Patrick LaveUe

